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Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious disease that caused several large 
outbreaks in Europe in the last century. The last important outbreak in Switzerland took 
place in 1965/66 and affected more than 900 premises and more than 50,000 animals 
were slaughtered. Large-scale emergency vaccination of the cattle and pig population 
has been applied to control the epidemic. In recent years, many studies have used 
infectious disease models to assess the impact of different disease control measures, 
including models developed for diseases exotic for the specific region of interest. Often, 
the absence of real outbreak data makes a validation of such models impossible. This 
study aimed to evaluate whether a spatial, stochastic simulation model (the Davis Animal 
Disease Simulation model) can predict the course of a Swiss FMD epidemic based on 
the available historic input data on population structure, contact rates, epidemiology of 
the virus, and quality of the vaccine. In addition, the potential outcome of the 1965/66 
FMD epidemic without application of vaccination was investigated. Comparing the model 
outcomes to reality, only the largest 10% of the simulated outbreaks approximated the 
number of animals being culled. However, the simulation model highly overestimated the 
number of culled premises. While the outbreak duration could not be well reproduced 
by the model compared to the 1965/66 epidemic, it was able to accurately estimate 
the size of the area infected. Without application of vaccination, the model predicted a 
much higher mean number of culled animals than with vaccination, demonstrating that 
vaccination was likely crucial in disease control for the Swiss FMD outbreak in 1965/66. 
The study demonstrated the feasibility to analyze historical outbreak data with modern 
analytical tools. However, it also confirmed that predicted epidemics from a most care-
fully parameterized model cannot integrate all eventualities of a real epidemic. Therefore, 
decision makers need to be aware that infectious disease models are useful tools to 
support the decision-making process but their results are not equal valuable as real 
observations and should always be interpreted with caution.
Keywords: foot-and-mouth disease, control strategies, switzerland, model validation, historic data, emergency 
vaccination, DaDs
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FigUre 1 | The spread of the foot-and-mouth disease epidemic from the 21 October 1965 to the 21 February 1966 in switzerland (map includes 
lakes and cantonal borders). Source: archives of the Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office. The legend lists the affected communities in three categories 
pictured by different sizes of the points: 1–3 cases (smallest), 4–9 cases, and 10 or more cases (largest). The red circles symbolize the two index case villages  
(1, Schönenbuch; 2, Brent).
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inTrODUcTiOn
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is one of the most contagious 
animal diseases of cloven-hoofed animals with high economic 
impact (1). The agent, the FMD virus, can be distinguished in 
seven serotypes and these further in numerous subtypes (1). The 
serotypes A, O, and C caused three big epidemics in Switzerland 
in the last century (2).
The last of these epidemics emerged in 1965/66 and spread 
over large part of Switzerland (Figure  1). It was caused by 
the strain O1 (serotype O, subtype 1), which was later called 
O1-Lausanne (3). Only few FMD cases had been reported before 
the epidemic during early 1965. These were mostly found in east-
ern Switzerland. All of these cases were caused by the serotypes 
A or C (communication of the Federal Veterinary Office, volumes 
34–52, 1965). On 21st of October 1965, the first case of FMD, 
caused by the serotype O1, was reported in Brent, canton of Vaud 
in western Switzerland. The second case came to light just 3 days 
later in Schönenbuch, canton of Basel-Landschaft (4). In both 
cases, pigs were affected first. These pigs were fed with kitchen 
garbage from nearby hotels. Therefore, it was assumed that the 
virus had been imported via contaminated meat as the disease 
caused several epidemics in European countries (for example, 
Spain, Hungary, or Austria) at that time (2). The outbreak in 
canton Basel-Landschaft was brought under control rapidly 
by slaughtering all livestock present on the infected premises 
(IP). In the meantime, despite the slaughtering of animals on 
IPs, the disease spread from the outbreak in Brent to the region 
around the Lake Geneva and further afield to affect nearly the 
whole Swiss lowland with a few cases recorded in the alpine 
mountain region (4). The peak of new cases was reported at 
the end of December 1965. After vaccinating two-thirds of the 
entire cattle population by the end of 1965, and the remaining 
third by the middle of January 1966, the number of new cases 
slowly decreased (communications of the Federal Veterinary 
Office, volumes 1–14, 1966). However, because pigs had not been 
vaccinated a new “pig-FMD epidemic” developed in canton of 
Lucerne (4). This autonomous epidemic could only be stopped 
after implementation of a vaccine, developed especially for pigs, 
which was used in addition to the monovalent vaccine applied 
before. The epidemic was brought under control by the end of 
March 1966 (4). However, sporadic cases have been observed 
thereafter until June 1966 from when onward no FMD case was 
recorded until early December 1966 (4).
The control measures taken in this FMD epidemic did not 
differ greatly from the measures foreseen in the current Swiss 
and European contingency plan, disregarding the slaughtering 
instead of the nowadays culling (Council directive 2003/85/EC 
of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control 
of FMD). They consisted of slaughtering of all animals on IPs in 
determined slaughterhouses, epidemiological surveillance, move-
ment restrictions, cleaning, and disinfection on the IPs (4). The 
meat was sold for consumption after treatment with lactic acid. 
In addition to the current default measures, a ring vaccination 
was implemented. Control, surveillance, and vaccination zones 
were assigned according to local conditions, taking the landscape, 
localization of farms, or villages and infrastructure into account. 
At that time, no explicit size of the zones was required by the Swiss 
legislation. Even though ring vaccination was applied intensively, 
it could not prevent the disease from spreading further, which 
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was the reason why the entire cattle population was vaccinated by 
January 1966. Once mass vaccination was completed, slaughter-
ing was limited to non-vaccinated animals and animals showing 
clinical symptoms (4). Vaccinated animals on IPs without clinical 
signs were revaccinated if the time period since the last vacci-
nation was longer than 12 days (Conference of Cantonal Chief 
Veterinarians, 1966).
Retrospective view on the data suggests that the country-wide 
cattle and pig vaccination was the crucial intervention to control 
the 1965/66 FMD epidemic and finally eradicated the virus. 
However, no comparable dataset is available to investigate this 
hypothesis. What would have happened without vaccination? 
Nowadays, computer-based simulation models are useful tools to 
investigate control measures and impacts of theoretical epidem-
ics. In the present study, the spread of the 1965/66 FMD epidemic 
in Switzerland with and without vaccination was simulated and 
compared.
Stochastic computer models exist since the 1950s (5). 
Different FMD models have been developed by international 
research groups, including InterSpread (6, 7), Auspread (8, 9), 
North American Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM) 
(10), Exodis FMD (11), the Warwick model (12, 13), and Davis 
Animal Disease Simulation (DADS) model (14). Epidemiological 
models were used in numerous countries (e.g., Denmark, USA, 
Switzerland, UK) to simulate epidemics on FMD and to inves-
tigate benefit of vaccination or cost savings of different control 
measures (14–22). Furthermore, decision support tools have 
been developed based on simulation results (23). While some 
of these models were used based on real outbreak data [e.g., the 
FMD outbreak in 2001 in Great Britain (12, 24) or 2010 in Japan 
(25)], others were generated for FMD-free countries integrating 
detailed information on agricultural practices and population 
structure (8, 21).
In the present study, the DADS model was applied, which 
has been modified from an earlier study on FMD epidemics in 
Switzerland (21). The objectives of the present study were to 
evaluate how well the DADS model replicates the 1965/66 FMD 
epidemic and to evaluate the effectiveness of the vaccination 
strategy applied during that outbreak. The study combined cur-
rent modeling techniques and historic outbreak information, in 
order to inform policy makers for decisions on how to control 
FMD outbreaks in the future.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
swiss livestock Premises in 1966
Switzerland consists of 26 cantons which, in 1966, were further 
subdivided into 3085 communities. These communities cor-
respond to one or few postal code areas depending on the size 
of the community.
Data on livestock population were available from a census 
conducted in 1966, which was obtained from the Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office. The data were manually entered into Microsoft 
Excel, because the censuses were only digitized after 1975. For 
each livestock species, the number of owners per community 
was recorded. The total number of premises per community was 
not available. Therefore, a farmer who owned pigs and cattle was 
counted twice, as a cattle owner and as a pig owner. The number 
of animals per species per community was also available from 
the livestock census. Additionally, the percentage of farms with 
different herd size categories per species was available on can-
tonal, but not community, level. Recorded categories for cattle 
consisted of 1–4, 5–10, 11–20, and >20 animals, for pigs of 1–3, 
4–10, and >10 animals, and for small ruminants of 1–5, 6–25, 
and >25 animals.
Demography data had therefore to be reconstructed. In a 
first step, the number of premises per community and premises 
type was calculated. Premises types were defined based on the 
farmed species while any possible combination of the four species 
(cattle, pig, sheep, and goat) with one to four different species 
on each premises was considered (Table 1). As no data on farm 
structure in 1965/66 were available, contemporary witnesses were 
interviewed to estimate the relative distribution of mixed versus 
single-species farms. They answered consistently that in 1965/66, 
there were few premises that kept only one species of cloven-
hoofed animals. The majority of premises farmed cattle and pigs 
and/or small ruminants. Cattle and pig were the most important 
productive livestock, while small ruminants played a minor role. 
First, based on the number of livestock owners per species and 
community and the assumption that cattle–pig premises were 
predominant, the number of the cattle–pig premises per com-
munity was equal to the number of cattle or pig owner, whichever 
was smaller. Second, if there were more cattle than pig owners 
in a community, the goats and sheep owners were allocated to 
the remaining cattle owners resulting in mixed cattle–sheep or 
 cattle–goat premises, respectively. Vice  versa, if more pig than 
cattle owners were situated in a community, the sheep and goat 
owners were allocated to remaining pig owners resulting in 
pig–sheep or pig–goat premises, respectively. Third, if goat and 
sheep owners were left, they were classified as small ruminant 
(sheep–goat) premises. Finally, all remaining owners were either 
counted as single species or cattle–pig-small ruminant premises 
based on the number and type of owners remaining. The output 
of this allocation was a list of the number of 15 different premise 
types per community (Table 1, summarized overall Switzerland).
In a second step, the number of animals per species and 
community was randomly distributed to the premises. From the 
livestock census, the percentage of different herd size categories 
per species was available for each canton. Principally, the animals 
were distributed to the premises proportionally to those reported 
herd size categories. If this cantonal distribution did not fit to 
a community (e.g., if a community had an extraordinary high 
number of small premises compared to the average in the same 
canton), the animals were distributed equally to all premises in 
the given community. This procedure resulted in herd sizes of 
1–1801 animals (Table 1).
In a third step, since only the community, and not the exact 
geographic locations, of the premises was known in 1966, the 
coordinates (WGS 84) were generated randomly in the corre-
sponding postal code area in which the premises were located. 
Lakes and areas higher than 1500 m were omitted, as the 1966 
FMD outbreak occurred in winter when alpine premises were 
unpopulated. These coordinates were assigned randomly to the 
reconstructed premises (Figures S1 and S2 in Supplementary 
TaBle 1 | number and size of premises per type of the reconstructed 
livestock population in switzerland based on the census of 1966.
Premises type number of premises  
(total 138,587)
number of animals
range Median
Cattle 15,283 1–76 12
Pig 2645 1–382 5
Sheep 4575 1–1801 6
Goat 4631 1–97 2
Cattle–pig 81,660 2–524 24
Cattle–sheep 11,319 2–432 19
Cattle–goat 8837 2–151 12
Pig–sheep 463 2–148 13
Pig–goat 212 2–62 7
Sheep–goat 2664 2–489 15
Cattle–pig–sheep 1456 3–153 26
Cattle–pig–goat 1757 3–130 10
Pig–sheep–goat 47 3–71 14
Cattle–sheep–goat 361 3–116 21
All four species 2677 4–176 26
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Material). The coordinates for 26 communities had to be gener-
ated manually because they were located extraordinary high 
(>1500 m), and nevertheless inhabited throughout the year.
collection of historical Data
The incidence reports (weekly number of new outbreaks per 
community) of the 1965/66 FMD outbreaks were obtained 
from the Swiss Federal Veterinary Office. The original reports, 
with details of the IPs including the number of infected cattle or 
pigs, are archived in the Swiss Federal Archives. Unfortunately, 
these records were not complete, especially in the time period 
from December 1965 to January 1966, when the majority of 
cases occurred and personnel resources were limited to record 
them completely. Nevertheless, these data informed parameter 
estimations such as shipment size, farmer compliance to move-
ment restrictions, or limitations for the number of slaughtered 
animals per day due to limited personal and material resources. 
Additionally, reports from Conference of Cantonal Chief 
Veterinarians, the annual reports of the Swiss Federal Veterinary 
Office, FMD reports to the Swiss Minister of Economy and the 
States Archive of the canton of Zürich were used to gain insight 
into agricultural practices at that time to better estimate model 
parameter values. Furthermore, additional background informa-
tion about agricultural life and farming practices in the 1960s has 
been collected from several experts, who were contemporary wit-
nesses, virologists, and former veterinarians and former employ-
ees of the Federal Vaccine Institute, by personal interviews.
The simulation Model
The DADS model was developed to simulate FMD outbreaks in 
California, using R environment software (https://cran.r-project.
org/) (14, 26). It is a stochastic, spatiotemporal model, which 
allows simulations of the spread of a disease among spatially 
explicit premises. At the start of the simulation, the disease 
is introduced to one or more premises. The infected animals 
pass through a latent, subclinical infectious, clinical infectious, 
and immune stage if not culled earlier. The time they spend in 
one of these stages is sampled from user-defined distributions. 
All animals on IPs are eventually culled. The time step used by 
the model is one day. Direct contact (DC, animal movement), 
high-risk indirect contacts (HRIC, e.g., via veterinarians or cattle 
dealer), and low-risk indirect contacts (LRIC, e.g., via visitors, 
virus spread via visits of cheese dairy or restaurants) are consid-
ered by the model. Also, local area spread (including airborne 
spread), containing short distance disease spread not covered by 
DC or IC is included in the model. Control measures such as 
culling, movement restrictions, and vaccination can be applied by 
the user. All input parameters of the model with their values are 
used in this study and the sources of information are presented in 
supplementary Table S1 in Supplementary Material.
Here, the DADS model already adapted earlier to the 
Switzerland (21) was modified in five ways. First, the time delay 
between the detection of IP and culling was introduced as a step 
function instead of a fixed value. If the number of animals to cull 
exceeded a certain threshold, the time delay from diagnosis to 
culling increased. This reflects the fact that personal and transport 
capacities are limited and critical during time periods with a high 
incidence. Consequently, time to cull and infectious period for 
individual animals increased, which may enlarge the epidemic. 
Second, three parameters (“time to extended vaccination cat-
tle,” “time to extended vaccination pig,” and “larger vaccination 
radius”) were integrated to permit a nation-wide vaccination from 
a user-defined point in time during the outbreak. The former two 
parameters reflect the point in time when nation-wide vaccina-
tion started in 1965/66, which differed between cattle and pig 
premises. The latter parameter is an extended vaccination radius 
that results in a nation-wide vaccination. The parameter defining 
the premises types to be vaccinated also had to be adapted when 
the pigs were added as targeted species for vaccination. Third, the 
parameters “time vac all cattle,” “time vac all pig,” and “larger vac-
cination radius2” were defined. The first and second parameters 
were used to define a point in time when state-wide cattle and 
pig vaccination, respectively, should be completed. At this point 
in time, all premises with cattle (or pig) that have not been vac-
cinated yet were vaccinated in a radius that was defined by the last 
parameter. Fourth, the shipment size (number of animals per DC 
to other premises) was defined for each premises type individually 
as usually the number of animals shipped depends on the species 
(size of vehicle, herd structure). Cattle and goat were often shipped 
as individuals, whereas pigs and sheep were usually shipped in 
groups. Finally, the epidemiological phases were defined for each 
premises type individually, as the latent, subclinical, and clinical 
periods of FMD depend on the species.
Sales yards were not included in the model. It was assumed 
that markets and local sales yards in the affected regions were 
closed due to the outbreak, and therefore their impact on the 
epidemic was assumed to be negligible.
Model Parameterization for switzerland in 
1965/66
The aim of this study was to evaluate how well the model will 
perform for a prediction and evaluation of control strategies of 
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future outbreaks. Because outbreak data will not be available 
in future epidemics, parameter values will have to be estimated 
based on best knowledge from varying sources (notably data on 
livestock premises and transports, literature, and expert opinion). 
Therefore, also in this study, most parameter values were defined 
based on diverse sources of information (expert opinion, historical 
reports, literature) rather than fitted to the outbreak data (Table S1 
in Supplementary Material). Input parameters are categorized as 
general input, intra-premises spread, inter-premises spread, and 
control strategy parameters. Values for general parameters were 
gathered from historical sources and expert opinion. The model 
simulation time was set to 2 years to allow substantially longer 
outbreaks than in 1965/66 (which lasted 150 days). As in 1965 
FMD was endemic, it was assumed that the disease awareness was 
much higher and farmers would have recognized clinical signs 
in about a week – earlier than today where it was found to be 
on average 14–15 days, although with a high variability between 
observed epidemics (27). FMD already was a notifiable disease in 
Switzerland during the time of the outbreak and, therefore, it can 
be assumed that most cases were reported readily after detection. 
Based on expert opinion and information derived from the pro-
tocol of a conference of the World Animal Health Organization 
in Rome after the epidemic (in March 1966), the initial diagnosis 
delay was set at 7 days. Once the first case has been detected, the 
diagnosis delay was assumed to be reduced to 2–5 days, because 
disease awareness increased. Intra-herd transmission parameters 
are generic and were sourced from the literature (14). Inter-herd 
transmission parameters, i.e., probabilities of FMD transmission 
given a contact, were adopted from earlier work on FMD simula-
tion in Switzerland (21, 28). Daily rates of DC, LRIC, and HRIC 
were based on the statements of six contemporary witnesses who 
were interrogated on the frequency of contact types between 
premises (animal shipment, veterinarian visits, visits from other 
farmers, indirect contacts via cheese dairy, restaurants, or church 
visits). Parameter values differed between contact type and prem-
ises type (Table S1 in Supplementary Material). Contact rates of 
mixed premises (more than one species) were assumed the same 
as those for pig or cattle premises, respectively, if one of these spe-
cies was present on the premise. For all other mixed premises, the 
contact rates for the species with the highest contact rates were 
assigned. Distributions of distances for DC and IC were defined 
based on personal interviews of the six contemporary witnesses 
and, for DC, compared with historic outbreak data. Statements of 
the witnesses revealed that DC predominantly occurred within 
villages and communities (up to 25  km) but also beyond with 
decreasing probability for larger distances. This information was 
incorporated into the model by visually fitting the DC distances 
to a Weibull distribution. The distance distribution of the HRIC 
was defined as 50% of the contacts occurred within 4 km (within 
a village), one-fourth within a community (up to 25  km) and 
one-fourth beyond (up to 50 km). The most relevant LRIC was 
stated to occur via cheese dairies. Their catchment area was esti-
mated to be up to 10 km in the 1960s in Switzerland. The distance 
distribution of LRIC was, therefore, defined as uniform between 
0 and 10 km. For 9.8% (4/41) of the parameters, information of 
any source, including expert opinion, was lacking, and values 
had to be based on assumptions (Table S1 in Supplementary 
Material). These were (a) the number of infected animals in the 
index herd (a pig premises) that was set at 100 out of 120 pigs as 
contaminated feed was expected as source of infection that can 
simultaneously infect all fed animals, (b) the time period needed 
to vaccinate the premises within a given radius that was assumed 
to be 8 days based on discussion with veterinary authority, (c) the 
time period between the detection of the first clinical case and 
the delivery of the vaccine that was assumed to be 14 days based 
on discussion with veterinary authority, and (d) the assumption 
that DC between premises were only possible with equal prob-
ability when the same species were present in both the sender 
and receiver premises.
Parameter values for control measures were mainly informed 
by experts. The duration of control zones was implemented as 
described in the minutes of the Conference of Cantonal Chief 
Veterinarians of January 1966, even though experts reported that 
it was not always respected. The diameter of control zones was 
estimated based on outbreak reports from the States Archives of 
the canton of Zurich and by information from contemporary wit-
nesses. Vaccination effectiveness was sourced from the minutes of 
the Conference of Cantonal Chief Veterinarians of January 1966 
and expert opinion.
Model simulations and Data analysis
Basic control measures consisted of culling of all IP within a 
specific delay after FMD detection (stamping out), implemen-
tation of surveillance (6  km around IP), and protection (4  km 
around IP) zones with restricted animal movements for 21 days 
for both zones after stamping out of the triggering IP and tracing 
backward and forward. Premises targeted for culling are depopu-
lated within a given time frame after detection, defined by the 
stochastic culling delay parameter. The culling delay was set at 
2–3 days, and increased to 5–6 days for days when more than 200 
premises are allocated for culling in a day.
The vaccination was implemented in four steps. The first step 
was vaccination of premises that kept cattle within a radius of 
5 km around IP starting 2 weeks after the detection of the first 
FMD case. The vaccination area was extended to a radius of 
25  km starting to simulate nation-wide vaccination from day 
55 onward. This was approximately the point in time when 
nation-wide vaccination was implemented during the 1965/66 
outbreak [middle of December 1965 (4)]. The second step was 
to complete the nation-wide vaccination of all cattle premises at 
day 84 by changing the vaccination radius to 400 km (covering 
whole Switzerland) that resulted in the vaccination of the entire 
cattle population by the middle of January 1966. Third, as the 
pig population was also vaccinated in 1966, all premises types 
with pigs within a radius of 25 km around an IP were additionally 
vaccinated starting at day 85. In a fourth step, as previously done 
for cattle, all pig premises not yet vaccinated at day 100 were vac-
cinated at this day by increasing the vaccination radius 400 km. 
The efficacy of the vaccine on herd level was set at 80–90%.
To assess the impact of the vaccination as a control strategy, 
a scenario without vaccination (NV) was simulated, considering 
same measures otherwise. Model simulations were performed 
with 150 simulations each for vaccination (V) scenario and NV 
scenario. The number of simulations was based on a previous 
FigUre 2 | epidemic curve of the 1965/66 outbreak (bold dashed line) 
in comparison to the 10% (n = 15) largest simulated model outbreaks 
in relation to the number of animal culled, presented in quartiles. 
Given that the outbreak data of 1965/66 only exists by week, the model 
output was scaled to weekly intervals.
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study where DADS was used to simulate FMD outbreaks in 
Switzerland (21). The simulations run over 730 days (2 years).
The duration of the outbreak and number of animals and 
premises culled were assessed for the V scenario and compared 
with the real outbreak data from 1965/66. The end of the out-
break was defined as the point in time when the number of culled 
animals fall below 14, the average number of animals reported 
of being slaughtered per day in 1966 due to FMD after the out-
break was controlled (communication of the Federal Veterinary 
Office, volumes 15–52, 1966). To analyze the agreement of the 
spatial spread of FMD between model and reality, the area and 
position of the minimum convex polygon (MCP, R package 
adehabitatHR) of the 10% most fitting simulated outbreaks in 
regard to the number of culled animals was compared with the 
MCP of the real outbreak in 1965/66. Additionally, duration of 
the outbreak and number of animals and premises culled for 
simulations with and without vaccination were compared using 
independent Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. All analyses were 
performed using R.
sensitivity analysis
Thirteen parameters that were suspected to have the biggest 
influence on the model outcome were analyzed: number of index 
animals per herd, detection delay for index and secondary cases, 
frequencies of daily DC and IC and their distances, shipment size 
for DC, time period between detection of IP and culling (culling 
delay), time period between detection of IP and vaccination (vac-
cination delay), and vaccine efficacy. To perform the sensitivity 
analysis, the values were varied ±15% around the default value 
based on previous work (21). For stochastic parameters, the 
range of the default distribution was set at −15% and +15%, 
respectively. Each parameter was tested separately by performing 
150 simulations per value while keeping the values of all other 
parameters at the default.
Three outcome variables were considered for sensitivity 
analysis: duration of the outbreak, number of animals culled, and 
number of premises culled. Independent Wilcoxon signed-rank 
tests were performed to compare the outcomes using different 
parameter values.
resUlTs
accuracy of Model simulations and  
effect of Vaccination
By comparing the results of the model to the data of the real 
epidemic, only the largest simulated outbreaks (maximum 55,990 
animals culled) approximated the observed number of slaughtered 
animals (51,215 animals were slaughtered in 1965/66) (Figure 2). 
Regarding the number of premises depopulated (942 in 1965/66), 
the largest simulated outbreak exceeds these numbers by 2238 
premises (Table 2). The number of premises in which slaughter-
ing took place in 1965/66 equates best to the 81.5 percentile of the 
model output (943 premises culled). The duration of the outbreak 
in 1965/66 could not be reproduced by the simulation model 
(Table 2; Figure 2). Taking into account the 10% largest outbreak 
simulations only, they all exceeded the duration of the observed 
outbreak by the factor of 3.5 at least. Particularly, after the peak 
of the epidemic in 1965/66 (week 21), the simulated epidemics 
continued, although at a low level (Figure  2). The 10% largest 
simulated outbreaks all covered an area similar to the area affected 
in 1965/66, which demonstrates that the nation-wide spread of 
FMD could be reconstructed by the model (Figure 3). The sizes of 
MCP area of the 10% largest simulated outbreaks, which ranged 
from 25,916 km2 to 40,177 km2 (medium 33,610 km2), were found 
to be similar to the one of the real epidemic (33,269 km2).
The scenario without implementation of vaccination resulted 
in significantly higher numbers of animals and premises to cull 
compared to the vaccination strategy (p <  0. 0.002, Table  2). 
The outbreak duration was also significantly longer for the NV 
scenario (p =  0.01). The majority (61%, 92 out of 150) of the 
non-vaccination strategy simulations caused a similar number 
of animals culled as the vaccination strategy (Figure 4, insets). 
These outbreaks also had a similar outbreak duration distribu-
tion as when vaccination was applied (Figure  5). However, 58 
out of the 150 simulations (39%) of the non-vaccination strategy 
became very large with a maximum number of animals culled of 
almost 1.2 Mio (Figure 4, bottom). They also were long lasting 
with 12 outbreaks not yet finished after 730 days (the maximum 
duration allowed in the model simulations) (Figure 5, bottom). 
The maximum of animals being culled for simulations where 
vaccination applied (almost 56,000 animals) was substantially 
smaller (Figure  4, top) and only four outbreaks were not yet 
finished after 730 days (Figure 5, top).
TaBle 2 | summaries of predicted outbreak duration in days, number of culled animals and number of iP of 150 model simulations for the scenario with 
vaccination (V) and without vaccination (nV) in comparison with the recorded data of the 1965/66 FMD outbreak in switzerland.
Outbreak duration animals culled infected Premises
V nV V nV V nV
Minimum 12 12 123 129 1 1
25th percentile 25 24 249 285 5 6
Median 56 79 605 774 20 20
75th percentile 224 725 4088 865,785 176 35,818
90th percentile 520 553 30,381 974,246 1690 39,623
92.5th percentile 656 718 31,299 994,246 1876 40,272
95th percentile 714 724 32,400 1,012,856 2080 41,280
97.5th percentile 718 725 35,522 1,030,458 2378 42,240
Maximum 730 730 55,990 1,195,757 3180 47,122
The outbreak duration of the 1965/66 epidemic was 150 days with 51,215 animals in 942 premises culled.
FigUre 3 | Minimum convex polygon (McP) of the 10% largest simulated outbreaks in relation to the number of animal culled (colored area) in 
comparison with the McP of a FMD outbreak occurred in switzerland in 1965/66 (black polygon).
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sensitivity analysis
Seven parameters showed a significant influence on the simulated 
outbreak duration for the upper values, i.e., when values 15% 
higher than the default value were used (Figure  6). When the 
number of index animals was set to 120, which correspond to the 
number of pigs on the index farm, the median of the outbreak 
FigUre 5 | Outbreak duration of the 150 simulated FMD outbreaks in 
the swiss livestock population in 1965/66 when vaccination was 
applied (top) and not applied (bottom). The red vertical lines represent the 
outbreak duration of the real FMD epidemic in Switzerland in 1965/66. The 
outbreaks in the blue box of the non-vaccination strategy are those referred 
to as large outbreaks (n = 58).
FigUre 4 | Total number of culled animals of the 150 simulated FMD 
outbreaks in the swiss livestock population in 1965/66 when 
vaccination was applied (top) and not applied (bottom). The red vertical 
lines represent the number of culled animals during the real FMD epidemic in 
Switzerland in 1965/66. The insets zoom into the range of outbreaks with 
less 10,000 animals culled. The outbreaks in the blue box of the non-
vaccination strategy are those referred to as large outbreaks (n = 58).
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duration increased significantly from 56 to 106 days (p = 0.025). 
A higher shipment size showed a significant influence on the 
duration by increasing the median by 15 days (p = 0.044). When 
the diagnosis delay (i.e., the period between the start of clinical 
symptoms and the detection of FMD on the IP) of the index IP, 
the diagnosis delay of secondary IPs and the frequency of LRIC 
were set to 15% above their default value, the median outbreak 
duration increased to 86, 107, and 116, respectively (p < 0.01). A 
15% higher frequency of DC and a longer delay between detec-
tion of FMD on the IP and culling of the animals (culling delay) 
increased the median to 146  days and 104  days, respectively 
(p-value < 0.0005).
The increase of the values of eight parameters by 15% 
showed significant influence on the number of culled animals 
and premises (Figure  7). The shipment size, the number 
of index animals, and the frequency of HRIC significantly 
increased the median number of culled animals from 905 to 
897, 1376, and 958, respectively, and the median of culled 
premises (20 in the default scenario) to 30, 42, and 28 
(p <  0.05). When the diagnosis delay of the index IP, diag-
nosis delay of secondary IPs and the frequency of the LRIC 
increased by 15%, the number of culled animals augmented 
significantly to 1202, 1338, and 1872, respectively, and the 
number of culled premises to 40, 46, and 62 (p < 0.005). As 
for the outbreak duration, the culling delay and the frequency 
of DC showed the highest significant influence on the number 
of culled animals and premises (p < 0.0002). A longer culling 
delay and higher frequency of DC resulted in an increase of 
the median of culled animals to 1045 and 1603, respectively, 
and culled premises to 52 and 66.
For the 15% decrease of the default value and for all other 
parameters tested in the sensitivity analysis, no significant influ-
ence on the outbreak duration and number of culled animals and 
premises was detected (p > 0.05).
DiscUssiOn
This study used historical data to reproduce a FMD outbreak with 
a modern epidemiological model to investigate the accuracy of 
disease spread predictions by this model. The research objec-
tive was not to achieve an improved fit to the outbreak data by 
optimizing the parameterization of the model. Instead, we used 
the best available data from historical and current literature, 
expert opinion, and contemporary witnesses as inputs – the same 
sources that would be available to inform parameter values for 
future epidemics. Therefore, we aimed to investigate how precise 
the model simulations are when parameterized according to 
best available knowledge, by comparing the simulations with the 
recorded data of the real outbreak.
The comparison of the simulated outbreaks and the real 
epidemic was mainly based on the number of culled animals, 
because data on animal level were more certain than those on 
premises level. This was because information on the number of 
animals of each species per community was known, whereas 
FigUre 7 | influence of model parameters found to be statistically 
significant (p < 0.05) on simulated number of animals culled during 
the sensitivity analysis. When increasing the value by 15% above the 
default value, the number of animals culled augmented. The boxes represent 
the interquartile range with the median as black line, the whiskers extend to 
the most extreme data point that is no more than 1.5 times IQR from the box. 
Index animal, number of animals in the index premises; DC, direct contact 
frequency; HRIC, high-risk indirect contacts frequency; LRIC, low-risk indirect 
contact frequency; shipment size, number of animals included in a DC; cull 
delay, delay between detection and depopulation of infected premises; initial/
sec diagn delay, delay between start of clinical signs and detection of FMD 
on the premises for the index premises and cases, respectively.
FigUre 6 | influence of model parameters found to be statistically 
significant (p < 0.05) on simulated outbreak duration during the 
sensitivity analysis. When increasing the value by 15% above the default 
value, the outbreak duration augmented. The boxes represent the 
interquartile range with the median as black line, the whiskers extend to the 
most extreme data point that is no more than 1.5 times IQR from the box. 
Index animal, number of animals in the index premises; DC, direct contact 
frequency; LRIC, low-risk indirect contact frequency; shipment size, number 
of animals included in a DC; cull delay, delay between detection and 
depopulation of infected premises; initial/sec diagn delay, delay between start 
of clinical signs and detection of FMD on the premises for the index premises 
and secondary cases, respectively.
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information on premises level was lacking for the year 1966 and 
the premises structure had to be reconstructed. In fact, the ratio 
of culled animals to depopulated premises in the model outcomes 
was found to be smaller than what was recorded during the real 
epidemic. Beside the issue of challenging premises reconstruction 
that might not fully represent the reality in 1966, this discrepancy 
of culled animal-IP ratio might also be caused by real reporting 
bias during the outbreak. Farmers with a larger premises size 
might have more likely recognized and reported the disease, or 
were more motivated to receive compensation for animal losses 
that requires reporting, which may result in underreporting for 
small IPs.
It was not possible to correctly reproduce the outbreak dura-
tion by the model. All simulations that approximated the real 
outbreak size by far exceeded the reported duration of the real 
epidemic. This was caused by cases occurring after the peak 
from week 21 onward when the real outbreak was declared to be 
controlled. Although this can be seen as a weakness of the model 
structure, the period of highest interest in model outputs is the 
earlier phase of the epidemic, in which critical control strategy 
decision are made (for example, whether to start vaccination).
The spatial spread of the 10% largest outbreaks well reflected 
the area infected during the real outbreak, although in 6 of those 
15 largest simulated outbreaks the disease spread to parts in 
the east of Switzerland, which had not been infected in 1965/66 
(Figure  3). Yet, the spatial distribution of the cases within the 
infected area differed from the real epidemic mostly by predict-
ing three clusters of cases, where hardly any case was reported 
in 1965/66. These clusters are located in the southern, middle-
western region of Switzerland, thus, in the alpine mountain area. 
Two explanations for this discrepancy are discussed. First, because 
the model did not consider the topography of Switzerland, and 
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therefore, movements also occur across the Alps similarly as in 
the lowland, these areas had a higher chance to be infected in the 
simulated epidemics than in reality. Once FMD was spread to 
these regions, the number of cases heavily depended on the local 
density of premises, which was high in all of the three cluster 
regions (Figure S3 in Supplementary Material). Second, there 
may well be a recording bias during the 1965/66 outbreak with 
significant underreporting of cases in the Alps, because access to 
the mountain valleys was limited, particularly during winter time 
when the epidemic peaked.
The Swiss FMD outbreak in 1965/66 was larger in terms of 
animals slaughtered than most model simulations predicted, 
but in congruence with the 10% largest simulated outbreaks 
(Table 2). Reasons for the large epidemic observed compared to 
simulated model outbreaks can be categorized into the following 
sources: (a) the model structure and/or parameter value estimates 
were not accurate enough to reflect the reality, (b) reporting bias 
during the real outbreak distorted the number of slaughtered 
animals recorded, and (c) it may be the truth that the 1965/66 
FMD epidemic in Switzerland was very large and it, therefore, 
should approximate the largest simulated outbreaks only.
Several issues in the model structure can be identified that 
suspect to cause smaller simulated outbreaks than observed in 
reality. First, the policy of slaughtering animals on IPs, which was 
applied in 1965/66, instead of culling and destroying on place, 
could have propagated the spread of FMD. The transportation of 
infectious animals to slaughterhouses allowed the virus to spread 
along traffic routes. In 1965/66, events were reported in which 
trucks, transporting infectious animals to the slaughter houses, 
had been the cause for the outbreak of FMD in premises near 
traffic routes (4). Another accumulation of outbreaks has been 
observed downstream slaughterhouses. Also, although the meat 
from infectious animals should have been treated with lactic acid 
before sold for consumption, it still remained a risk for further 
spread. Both of these possible pathways for FMD spread were 
not implemented in the model, where all animals on IP were 
considered to be culled on place.
Second, the model only allowed implementation of vaccina-
tion for specified premises types, but not for individual species 
within premises. Therefore, during the cattle vaccination cam-
paign, every premises type with cattle was chosen for vaccina-
tion, knowing that pigs and small ruminants in mixed premises 
with cattle were simulated to be vaccinated as well. This caused 
simulated vaccination coverage in the livestock population higher 
than in reality. With the pig vaccination campaign that was 
simulated to start after the completion of cattle vaccination, this 
effect was even pronounced for the small ruminant species. This 
overestimation of the livestock vaccination coverage may have led 
to smaller modeled outbreaks than reality.
Third, the statutory provisions for movement restrictions (size 
and retention of surveillance and protection zones) were used in 
the model knowing that they were not always respected properly. 
The proportion of disrespect of movement restrictions was not 
known. Witnesses believed that farmer compliance was about 
90% for DC, which was used as compliance level in the simulation 
model. For HRIC and LRIC, a lower value of 70–80% was used. 
As the real outbreak was bigger than the model predicted, it may 
be that farmer compliance was lower than 90%. This is supported 
by documents on criminal prosecutions in the States Archives of 
the canton of Zürich reporting that farmers mainly disrespected 
movement restrictions for family members. However, movement 
restrictions for animals seemed to have been well respected.
The second objective of the study was to investigate the effect 
of vaccination applied during the 1965/66 epidemic. Experience 
during the 1965/66 outbreak indicated that vaccination played a 
crucial role in stopping the epidemic (4). According to the model 
outputs vaccination does not provide much benefit for relatively 
small epidemics. However, when an outbreak becomes large, it 
was found that vaccination dramatically reduced the number 
of culled animals (Figure 4). These findings are consistent with 
the results of modeling the spread and control of FMD in the 
contemporary Swiss animal population, where vaccination was 
found to be effective to control large outbreaks (21). Evidence 
could, therefore, be gained for supporting the hypothesis that 
the mass livestock vaccination applied was pivotal to control 
the outbreak in 1965/66, as, according to the model outcomes, 
this epidemic was a large one. However, the definition of a 
threshold, probably a population-dependent one, above which 
an outbreak can be identified as large would be part of further 
investigation.
According to the model outputs, the outbreak duration was 
detected to be significantly longer when vaccination was not 
applied. However, this finding has to be interpreted with caution 
because of two reasons. First, four (2.6%) and 12 (8%) of the 150 
simulations for the vaccination and non-vaccination strategy, 
respectively, reached the defined time limit of 730 days and they 
would have probably lasted longer. The dataset for the statistical 
analysis was, therefore, biased toward shorter outbreak durations, 
particularly for the non-vaccination strategy. Second, the model 
did not well reproduce the outbreak duration of the real epidemic, 
thus, for the vaccination strategy, and therefore the outbreak 
duration may be a non-ideal measurement to compare between 
strategies. Nevertheless, the model outputs still provided evidence 
that the number of long-lasting outbreaks is considerably higher 
for the non-vaccination than vaccination strategy (Figure 5).
As in all models, the reality can never be fully reflected. The 
epidemic curve of the 1965/66 outbreak showed three peaks 
(week 10, 12, and 15) (Figure 2). After detection and implemen-
tation of control measures resulting in a decline of the curve, 
the second peak was caused by feeding of contaminated skim 
milk to pigs and calves and the third peak by the “pig-FMD out-
break,” because pigs had not been vaccinated until this point in 
time (4). Because the simulation model applied here is a generic 
FMD model in which such specific situations were not imple-
mented, these peaks could not be reproduced by the model. 
Also, the model samples contact premises randomly under con-
sideration of contact probabilities between premises types and 
distance between premises. However, social and commercial 
networks for both, DC and H/LRIC that certainly exist, were 
not respected in the model. It is expected that incorporation of 
such networks would reduce the variation between simulations 
that would lead to more precise predictions. However, intensive 
data collection would be required to inform such country-wide 
networks.
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Another factor not adequately represented in the model was 
the topography of Switzerland. In the implementation of move-
ment bans and ring vaccination in 1965/66, the topography 
was a determining factor, as according to statutory provisions 
these control measures were organized “depending on the local 
conditions” (e.g., considering lakes, mountains, or rivers). In the 
model, these zones were simulated as rings and they may have, 
therefore, been smaller or larger than in reality.
The role of the small ruminants was a challenging to handle 
in the model as historical data were completely lacking for 
the 1965/66 outbreak. They had neither been vaccinated nor 
related cases reported. Possible reasons can be that (a) at that 
time, small ruminants were considered as not important for the 
propagation of the disease, (b) there were no resources left to 
report or cull them, or (c) they were not affected in this epidemic. 
Although little was known about the role of small ruminants 
in 1965/66, they have been included in the simulation model 
because they have been reported to play an important role in 
the propagation of FMD elsewhere (16, 29, 30). As possibility 
(a) and (b) were considered to be more likely and records of 
slaughtered small ruminants were lacking, the diagnosis delay 
for pure small ruminants premises was set at a value that they 
would had never been detected, but still may had spread the 
disease during the infectious period. Further investigation of 
the potential impact of small ruminants on this outbreak by 
using varying probability of detection for these premises could 
contribute to better define their role in the 1965/66 but also 
future epidemics.
The sensitivity analysis using a variability of 30% around 
the default value revealed seven parameters to influence the 
outbreak duration and an additional parameter to influence the 
outbreak size: the culling delay, the diagnosis delay for both first 
and secondary cases, the frequency of DC and LRIC, the ship-
ment size, the number of index animals, and, only in terms of 
the outbreaks size, the frequency of HRIC. The significance of 
all these parameters can be well explained. The great influence of 
the culling delay is in accordance with experience from the Swiss 
outbreaks in the twentieth century. In all of the three epidemics 
that occurred in Switzerland in the twentieth century (1920/21, 
1939/40, and 1965/66), slaughtering has been delayed because 
of limited resources that led to increased disease propagation. 
Resource allocation for and planning of rapid culling and disposal 
strategies may, therefore, be crucial during the preparedness 
phase. The significance of the detection delay of FMD epidem-
ics and the diagnosis delay for secondary IPs is in accordance 
to other studies. For example, Carpenter et  al. estimated the 
number of culled animals to increase by factors 7 and 25 when 
the diagnosis of the first case increases from 1 to 2 and 3 weeks, 
respectively (31). Keeping the awareness of FMD but also other 
exotic diseases high in the veterinary and agriculture sector may 
thus have a pivotal role on the size of future epidemics. A high 
rate of DC, indirect contacts, and a larger shipment size leads to a 
higher probability of dissemination of the virus. A higher number 
of index animals resulting in a higher excretion of virus leads 
to a higher probability to transport a diseased animal before the 
onset of clinical signs and, therefore, increases the propagation of 
FMD via DC. The results of the sensitivity analysis also help to 
identify crucial parameters for which values should be estimated 
as accurate as possible to improve preparedness. Particularly, the 
quality of preparedness would benefit from most accurate data on 
the movement frequencies from and to premises (i.e., frequency 
of DC, HRIC, and LRIC). The extend of how much the model 
would perform better in case of more accurate movement data 
is hard to estimate. While animal movements are recorded on 
animal level for cattle and on premises level for pig in Switzerland, 
comprehensive data on DC for small ruminants are currently 
lacking. It would be of high relevance, not only for the spread of 
FMD but also other infectious diseases, to establish a comparable 
database for sheep and goats.
Infectious disease models are often used to forecast the devel-
opment of an ongoing epidemic and as a tool to support decision 
making. This study demonstrated that it is also useful as a tool 
to analyze previous or even historical outbreaks. However, it 
also confirmed that predicted epidemics from a model, even 
if it is parameterized most carefully, need not be correct in all 
aspects of epidemic sizes and duration. Often, the availability 
and quality of data required to reliably parameterize a simula-
tion model are limited. Here, while data on FMD cases were 
relatively well recorded, data on the susceptible population was 
only partly available and premises included in the model had to 
be reconstructed. Nevertheless, it could be demonstrated that in 
the Swiss FMD outbreak in 1965/66, vaccination seems to have 
been the crucial step for disease control. With vaccination as 
an additional measure to conventional strategies like depopula-
tion of IPs, movement bans, and disinfection, the epidemic was 
stopped in less than half a year, reducing the number of slaugh-
tered animals significantly compared to a NV scenario. As such, 
further evidence could be provided to support the emergency 
vaccination strategy for expected large FMD outbreaks. It is, 
therefore, essential to keep FMD expertise and disease aware-
ness alive, review personal and material resources to be prepared 
for future outbreaks, and reduce its impacts as much as possible.
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